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Living systems: autonomy, autopoiesis and enaction 
 
 
1     INTRODUCTION 
 
We do not think of rivers as moving according to their own purposes, or lightning as choosing its 
path to the ground. Nor do we say that the flame of a candle consumes the wax because it seeks 
to preserve its existence, or that it values the presence of oxygen because it contributes to its ex-
istence. We can easily see that such anthropomorphic biases are, in general, inappropriate when 
describing or explaining natural phenomena. If the teleological language of purpose, agency and 
valuation is usually inappropriate in scientific descriptions and explanations of natural phenome-
na, should we use it when studying the subclass of natural phenomena made up of living beings? 
Is there something radically different about living beings that sets them apart from the rest of 
natural phenomena, and necessitates the use of teleological explanatory and descriptive tools?  
In this paper, we compare two closely related approaches to the study of life and cognition – 
the enactive approach1 (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991; di Paolo, 2005; Thompson, 2007) 
and the autopoietic approach (Maturana, 1975, 1981, 1987, 2003) – and consider the different 
answers that they give to these questions. Doing so allows us to identify a problem at the heart of 
the enactive approach. We will see that both the enactive and autopoietic approaches begin from 
                                                
1 The label ‘enactivism’ has been applied to a wide variety of views. Some views have been dubbed enactivist only 
in virtue of their emphasis on the coupled dynamics of organism/environment interactions in their accounts of cogni-
tion (including Hurley 1998; Noë 2004; and Hutto and Myin 2012). Our discussion of enactivism here applies not to 
those views, but only to enactivist views that, in addition, accord central importance to the autopoietic organization 
of living systems. The most notable exponents of this kind of view are Francisco Varela (see e.g. Varela, Thompson 
and Rosch 1991, Varela and Weber 2001), Evan Thompson (see e.g. Thompson 1995, Thompson 2007) and 
Ezequiel di Paolo (see e.g. di Paolo 2005). All subsequent references to enactivism should be understood as pertain-
ing only to this latter autopoiesis-emphasising group of theories. Other enactivist treatments that fall under the scope 
of our critique here include Moreno and Barandarian (2004) and the papers collected in di Paolo, Stewart and 
Gapenne (2010). 
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the observation that living systems are in a particular kind of dynamic and reciprocal relationship 
with their environments. Comparing the different consequences that enactivists and autopoieti-
cists draw from this observation lets us see that the enactivist’s invocation of the kinds of teleo-
logical concepts described above is not legitimated by the appeal to the dynamics of organ-
ism/environment interactions in the way that enactivists have claimed. 
 
Before beginning, some provisional sketches of the respective attitudes to the study of life and 
mind held by autopoietic and enactive approaches will help to set the scene. The autopoietic the-
ory adopts what we take to be a strict naturalistic attitude, which says roughly: “Life is a natural 
phenomenon and must be studied as such; that is, by appealing to the same ontological assump-
tions and explanatory principles that we use to study any natural phenomenon in general. These 
ontological assumptions are, among others, that natural phenomena are what they are and occur 
as they occur (i) without having any goals, purposes or intentions;, (ii) without having any free-
dom to choose or select what to do, and (iii) without being governed by any normative consid-
eration in terms of what may be good or bad, beneficial or harmful.”  
The enactive approach, instead, adopts what we will call an existentialist attitude (given its in-
spiration in Jonas’ phenomenology of life, and through him, indirectly, in Heidegger’s existential 
phenomenology). The existentialist attitude says something like this: “Since we humans are liv-
ing beings, we know life from within – from the perspective of our lived experience – which is 
an epistemic privilege that we must not dismiss. We experience ourselves as free agents capable 
of making choices according to our own norms and values, as controlling our behaviour accord-
ing to our own goals and purposes, and as responding to a world that is not an indifferent envi-
ronment, but a meaningful horizon of possibilities. We are, in sum, ‘existential beings’ (in the 
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Heideggerian sense). Given that other organisms are living beings just as we are, why should we 
assume that they lack these properties that we experience as being involved in our living?’ 
This attitude, whose philosophical grounds we will discuss in the next section, assumes that 
all living beings, and only living beings, share a common form of existence that involves teleo-
logical properties and capacities such as purposefulness, intentionality, possibilities of action, 
agency, self-control, normativity, meaning, etc., and that justifies the use of special descriptive 
categories that cannot be applied to inorganic natural phenomena. 
Faced with these alternatives we might want to ask: “Which attitude, the naturalistic or the ex-
istentialist, is the correct one for the study of living beings?”, or “Which theory, the autopoietic 
or the enactive, tells us the truth about living beings?” Though our argument in this paper cer-
tainly bears on these important questions, it is not part of our aim to settle them here. In part this 
is because, we think, one can always conceive of a common and broader conceptual space in 
which both attitudes and theories may tell us, in their own terms, something sensible and useful 
about the phenomenon of life. Our purpose in this paper is instead to compare aspects of the con-
ceptual foundations of the autopoietic theory and the enactive approach in a way that brings out a 
problem for the way in which the enactivist justifies their ‘existential’ attitude to the study of life 
and cognition, and to highlight that this problem does not occur for the autopoietic view. The au-
topoietic view may nonetheless be misguided, or the enactivist’s ‘existential’ attitude may none-
theless be legitimated on other grounds. 
 
Before proceeding, a few words about the structure of the paper. In a standard (historical or ge-
nealogical) presentation of the two views and their relations, the autopoietic theory should come 
first and the enactive approach second. However, for our purposes, it is better to begin with a 
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brief reconstruction of the foundations of the enactive approach (Section 2), focused on its key 
concept of autonomy, and the way in which the enactivist thinks that this property of living sys-
tems derives from the dynamics of their structural coupling with the environment. We then re-
view, in Section 3, the autopoietic approach from which enactivists inherit their view of the dy-
namics of organism/environment interactions. The aim here is not to show that certain central 
concepts of the enactive approach have their roots in the autopoietic theory, which is a historical 
fact that, per se, offers no philosophical problem. Instead, presenting the two views in this way 
allows us to see clearly, in section 4, that the enactivist’s existential attitude toward life and cog-
nition does not follow from the view of the dynamics of organism/environoment relations that 
they share with the autopoietic theorist. 
 
2    THE ENACTIVE NOTION OF AUTONOMY 
 
The notion of autonomy plays a central role in the enactive approach. “A distinctive feature of 
the enactive approach is the emphasis it gives to autonomy,” says Thompson in his Mind in Life 
(2007, p. 37), whilst Di Paolo, Rohde and De Jaegher present autonomy as one of the “five high-
ly intertwined concepts that constitute the basic enactive approach” (2009, p. 37). The enactive 
notion of autonomy comes originally from Varela’s work (1979) on biological autonomy and 
self-referential calculus (mathematical formalizations of the concept of organizational closure), 
but the particular significance this notion has for the enactivist is usually brought out (see 
Thompson 2007, chapters 3 and 4) by combining it with two complementary theoretical ap-
proaches: 1) Dynamical Systems Theory (DST), and 2) Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of per-
ception and action. As we shall see below, it is in the context of these approaches that the notion 
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of autonomy takes on its distinctive importance for the enactive approach. For the enactivist, au-
tonomy marks a fundamental and exclusive property of living systems; their being centres of in-
tentional directedness and normative evaluation. In what follows we will analyze the notion of 
autonomy as presented in what we take to be the most comprehensive, canonical and updated 
exposition of enactivism thus far: Evan Thompson’s Mind in Life (2007). 
 
There, Thompson speaks of autonomy in two different but complementary senses: 1) autono-
my as self-determination, and 2) autonomy as organizational (or operational) closure. The first 
sense of autonomy is familiar: 
 
 [A]n autonomous system is a self-determining system, as distinguished from a 
system determined from the outside, or a heteronomous system. On the one hand, 
a living cell, a multicellular animal, an ant colony, or a human being behaves as a 
coherent, self-determining unity in its interactions with the environment. An au-
tomatic bank machine, on the other hand, is determined and controlled from the 
outside, in the realm of human design. (Thompson, 2007, p. 37)  
 
Autonomy is self-determination or self-government. A system is autonomous if it follows its 
own rules; if no external entity specifies, controls or commands its behaviour. A bank machine, 
and in general any man-made machine, operates following instructions given by an external 
agent, whereas living beings operate as self-determining systems that do not admit this kind of 
external command. This notion of autonomy has normative connotations (on which more below), 
as suggested by the word’s original social-political root: “Autonomy and heteronomy literally 
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mean, respectively, self-governed and other-governed.” (Thompson, 2007, p. 43. Original em-
phasis). 
 
The second sense of autonomy is more technical, and lacks a normative dimension. Here au-
tonomy refers to the way in which the constituent processes of a dynamic system are organized. 
“In complex systems theory, the term autonomous refers to a generic type of organization [where 
the] relations that define the autonomous organization hold between processes [...] rather than 
static entities.” (Thompson, 2007, p. 44. Original emphasis). An autonomous system, in this se-
cond sense, is basically a system whose processes are organized in a circular manner, like a 
closed circuit; hence the idea of organizational closure. “Every autonomous system is organiza-
tionally closed”, says Thompson quoting Varela (Varela, 1979, p. 58; Thompson, 2007, p. 48). 
The formal definition of autonomy as organizational closure includes three related aspects: 
 
In an autonomous system, the constituent processes (i) recursively depend on each 
other for their generation and their realization as a network, (ii) constitute the sys-
tem as a unity in whatever domain they exist, and (iii) determine a domain of pos-
sible interactions with the environment (Varela, 1979, p. 55, quoted by Thomp-
son, 2007, p. 44) 
 
As examples of this kind of system enactivists point out single cells, multicellular organisms, 
nervous systems, immune systems, microbial colonies, ecosystems, etc. (in general, any system 
that is a living being or whose relevant components are living beings). All such closed systems, 
says Thompson (2007), now combining both senses of autonomy, “need to be seen as sources of 
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their own activity, specifying their own domain of interactions, not as transducers or functions 
for converting input instructions into output products” (p. 46).  
 
2.1 Sensorimotor loops: without starting and end points 
 
Interestingly, when Thompson opens the chapter about autonomy in his book Mind in Life, he 
does it by reviewing some central concepts of Dynamic Systems Theory (DST). According to his 
view, “some basic ideas about dynamic systems [...] form a background for the enactive ap-
proach” (Thompson, 2007, p. 37). This link, as we shall see, is not trivial. For Thompson, “[t]he 
dynamicist idea that cognitive processes are always ongoing with no clear starting or end points” 
is a key one (2007, p. 43), and will determine in part the manner in which he reads the notion of 
“closure”. The circular (recursive) organization of autonomous systems challenges the linear and 
sequential descriptions of cognitive processes.2 In an ongoing circular network, starting and end 
points cannot be non-arbitrarily specified. Enactivists hold that the nervous system is an autono-
mous system, and hence an organizationally closed system. As a result, there is no non-arbitrary 
way of specifying starting and end points within its ongoing sensorimotor dynamic. To illustrate 
this idea, Thompson recurs to Merleau-Ponty and quotes a famous passage from The Structure of 
Behaviour.  
  
[I]t is clear that each of my movements responds to an external stimulation; but it 
is also clear that these stimulations could not be received without the movements 
                                                
2 This point is also of central importance to Hurley’s work on perception, agency and consciousness (Hurley, 1998). 
Importantly, Hurley does not combine this point with the ‘existentialist’ attitude we briefly sketched above (and will 
explore in more detail below), so her view does not suffer from the tension that we argue arises for the autopoietic 
enactivist. 
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by which I expose my receptors to their influence ... it is impossible to say “which 
started first” in the exchange of stimuli and responses. Since all movements of the 
organism are always conditioned by external influences, one can, if one wishes, 
readily treat behaviour as an effect of the milieu. But in the same way, since all 
the stimulations which the organism receives have in turn been possible only by 
its preceding movements which have culminated in exposing the receptor organ to 
the external influences, one could also say that the behaviour is the first cause of 
the stimulations. 
 (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p. 13, quoted by Thompson, 2007, p. 48) 
 
In the sensorimotor loop of the organism perception and action are inseparable, in the sense that 
they are co-dependent aspects of a single circular process. As Merleau-Ponty notes, an observer 
can, according to her own descriptive purposes, stipulate starting and end points within this pro-
cess. We can, for example, stipulate that the sensorimotor process begins with sensory stimula-
tion and ends with motor response. There is nothing inherently wrong with such stipulations. 
However, attention to the circular organisation of the sensorimotor process shows that these stip-
ulations do not reveal intrinsic properties of its dynamics. It would be equally valid to stipulate 
that the process begins with motor response and ends with sensory stimulation. Whether we see 
the dynamics of the system as running in one direction (sensationàaction) or the other (ac-
tionàsensation) has to do with our observational conventions, not with the organization of the 
system. That is why Merleau-Ponty says that in the exchange of stimuli and responses, “it is im-
possible to say which started first”; we can certainly assign starting and end points, but we can-
not find them. 
9 
 
 
2.2 From sensorimotor loops to meaningful worlds  
 
As will become clear in the next section, there is no significant divergence between enactiv-
ism and its autopoietic ancestors as far as the above account of the dynamic, circular organisation 
of cognitive systems is concerned. The divergence, which will ultimately result in a tension with-
in the enactive approach that fails to arise for its autopoietic ancestor, comes when the enactivist 
claims that the circular structure of sensorimotor processes has specific phenomenological rami-
fications. After analyzing the circularity of autonomous systems, Thompson adds an important 
claim about the consequences of the closed nature of their organization. Autonomous systems, 
thanks to their closure, emerge as “selves”, and in doing so, transform a (neutral) environment 
into a meaningful (enacted) “world”.   
 
 Whereas autopoietic closure brings forth a “bodily self” at the level of cellular 
metabolism, sensorimotor closure produces a “sensorimotor self” at the level of 
perception and action. [...] In both cases we see the co-emergence of inside and 
outside, of selfhood and correlative world or environment of otherness, through 
the generic mechanism of network closure (autonomy) (Thompson, 2007, pp. 48-
49)   
 
This idea is developed in several ways in Thompson’s treatment, but the key claim is that liv-
ing beings constitute a “perspective” or “point of view” according to which the (merely physical) 
surrounding emerges as a significant world, as an Umwelt (the term of von Uexküll, a favourite 
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author in the enactive literature). According to the enactivist, a living being is a biological self 
that specifies its own identity as something different from, though correlative to, the outside 
world. And the enactivist claim is that it can do this in virtue of the circular organisation of its 
sensorimotor dynamics, as described above:  
 
In the case of animal life, the environment emerges as a sensorimotor world 
through the actualization of the organism as a sensorimotor being. The organism 
is a sensorimotor being thanks to its nervous system. The nervous system con-
nects anatomically distant sensory and motor processes, subsuming them in op-
erationally closed sensorimotor networks. Through their coherent, large-scale pat-
terns of activity these networks establish a sensorimotor identity for the animal—
a sensorimotor self. In the same stroke, they specify what counts as “other”, 
namely, the animal’s sensorimotor world. (Thompson, 2007, p. 59) 
 
At this point we are already in Phenomenological terrain. The co-emergence of the biological 
self and its correlative world yields an intentional relation between the organism and its envi-
ronment. In keeping with the Phenomenological tradition, this intentional relation is understood 
by the enactivist not in terms of, “states having content but [in terms of] acts having directed-
ness” (Thompson 2007, p. 25. Original emphasis). The organism embodies an intentional experi-
ence that, strictly speaking, has no content (in the representational sense) but rather a particular 
orientation towards its world. Rather than representing an independent world, the organism is 
oriented towards a correlative and co-emergent world. This Phenomenological step is crucial. 
Since the organism has a “perspective” on the environment, the environment appears no longer 
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as a neutral and indifferent field of potential action, but instead as a field of relevance wherein 
certain things are important, desirable or good for the organism and others not. 
 How, according to the enactivist, do a meaningful environment and an intentionally-
directed organism arise from the circular dynamics of sensorimotor loops? The key lies in the 
ways in which the particular embodiment of the organism, and of the nervous system that modu-
lates its sensorimotor coupling with the environment, places constraints both on the portions of 
the world with which the organism can couple, and on the way in which those selective cou-
plings will unfold. Thompson (following Varela, 1991) walks us through a simple case: 
 
‘[C]onsider motile bacteria swimming uphill in a food gradient of sugar. These cells tum-
ble about until they hit on an orientation that increases their exposure to sugar, at which 
point they swim forward, up-gradient, toward the zone of greatest sugar concentration. … 
These bacteria are autopoietic and embody a dynamic sensorimotor loop: the way they 
move (tumbling or swimming forward) depends on what they sense, and what they sense 
depends on how they move. This sensorimotor loop both expresses and is subordinated to 
the cell’s autonomy… As a result, every sensorimotor interaction and every discriminable 
feature of the environment embodies or reflects the bacterial perspective. Thus although 
sucrose is a real and present condition of the physicochemical environment, its status as 
food is not. That sucrose is a nutrient is not intrinsic to the sucrose molecule, but is a rela-
tional feature, linked to the bacterium’s metabolism. Sucrose has significance or value as 
food, but only in the milieu that the organism itself enacts. Thus, thanks to the organism’s 
autonomy, its niche has a “surplus of significance” compared with the physicochemical 
environment.’ (Thompson, 2005, p.418) 
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In virtue of the structural properties of the bacterium and the part of the physical world in which 
it is located, the sensorimotor dynamics of the bacterium /environment coupling implicate only a 
subsection of the states and properties of the world. Thus, for the enactivist, the circular nature of 
the organism’s sensorimotor coupling with the environment grounds the co-emergence of prop-
erties in the environment that are meaningful to the organism (such as the sucrose’s property of 
‘being a nutrient’) and properties of the organism involving directedness toward its environment 
(such as its needing or aiming towards sucrose). This is what the enactivist has in mind when she 
claims that the autonomous character of an organism’s relation to its environment allows it to 
enact, or to bring forth, a meaningful world. The idiosyncracies of the organism’s embodiment 
lead to dynamic coupling with some aspects of the world rather than others, and it is in virtue of 
this fact that the world can appear to the organism as a value-laden environment toward which it 
is directed. 
It is this commitment of enactivism that lies behind its claim to have uncovered the origins of 
our mind in basic biological processes, and its commitment to the strong continuity of life and 
mind. The commitment is picked up on and developed in different ways by different enactivists; 
for example via the concept of  sense-making (Weber & Varela, 2002), or of adaptivity (Di Pao-
lo, 2005). We will not review these concepts here, though. It is enough, for the purposes of our 
discussion, that we have followed the reasoning through which the enactive approach, starting 
with the definition of living beings as autonomous systems, arrives at the view that living beings 
constitute identities or selves that specify their own outside (but not independent) world, toward 
which they are directed in a normative way.  
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3    AUTOPOIESIS: AUTONOMY?  
 
In the next section we will explain why we think that the role played by the concept of autonomy 
for the enactivist results in a problematic tension for the view. But to do so, it will help to con-
trast the conclusions that the enactivist draws from a system’s possession of circular structural 
dynamics with those drawn by the autopoietic theory. In the autopoietic theory (Maturana, 1975, 
1981, 1987, 2003), autonomy is a concept that appears occasionally in the description of living 
beings, but that is accorded no privileged status. There are no chapters (or even sections) dedi-
cated to autonomy, and the concept is never invoked as a part of the theory’s “conceptual core”. 
Nonetheless, the concepts of self-determination and organizational closure that, as we have just 
seen, underpin the enactive notion of autonomy do appear in the autopoietic literature and play 
important roles. In contrast to the enactivist, however, Maturana does not unify the notions of 
self-determination and organizational closure under the concept of autonomy (or under any con-
cept at all) because, as we shall see, in the autopoietic theory these notions are entirely independ-
ent.  
What enactivists call self-determination, i.e., the fact that the system does not admit external 
specifications or determinations, corresponds basically to what Maturana (1975, and subsequent-
ly) calls ‘structural determinism’. A structurally determined system is a system within which 
everything that happens is determined or specified by its own structure – by its own constitution 
or composition. External factors or interactions can trigger or initiate certain structural changes 
in the system (reactions, processes, behaviours) but cannot specify or instruct them. The ways in 
which structurally determined systems change, react and evolve over time are determined by 
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their particular structural dynamics, which cannot be altered by things external to the system.3 
Now, under this definition, which systems are structurally determined and which are not? Here is 
Maturana unpacking the idea: 
 
[T]he structural changes that a composite unity [in Maturana’s jargon ‘composite 
unity’ means ‘system’] undergoes as a result of an interaction are […] determined 
by the structure of the composite unity. Therefore, an external agent which inter-
acts with a composite unity only triggers, rather than determining in it a structural 
change. Since this is a constitutive condition for composite unities, nothing exter-
nal to them can specify what happens in them: there are no instructive interactions 
for composite unities. (Maturana, 2003, p. 61) 
 
Here Maturana speaks of “composite unities” in general, without making any distinction with-
in them. This is because, according to Maturana, every physical system, whether static or dynam-
ic, alive or not, natural or artificial, is a structurally determined system (Maturana, 1975, 1981, 
1987, 2003). For the autopoietic theory, then, systems are autonomous with respect to the speci-
fication of their changes of state regardless of whether their dynamics have the closed structure 
identified in the previous section. To say that living beings are autonomous systems, in the sense 
that the ways in which they change in response to external perturbations are not determined or 
governed by external factors, is, from this point of view, ontologically trivial and marks no inter-
esting difference with non-living systems.  
                                                
3 Note that this does not involve the obviously false claim that structurally determined systems cannot undergo 
change as a result of perturbations from their environment – the claim is rather that such changes will always unfold 
according to the fixed structural dynamics of the system. 
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The distinction that Thompson makes between living systems and machines (man-made arte-
facts), i.e., between autonomous and heteronomous systems, thus has no place in the autopoietic 
theory. Indeed, when Maturana explains the notion of structural determinism by appealing to our 
quotidian experience, he uses man-made machines as his examples:  
  
We know this [that systems are structurally determined] very well from using any 
of those pushbutton machines, in which if you push a button something hap-
pens—it washes, it glows, it plays music—which is not determined by your push-
ing the button, but, rather, is triggered by the pushing of the button [...] You do 
not instruct a system, you do not specify what has to happen in the system. If you 
start a tape recorder, you do not instruct it. You trigger it. (Maturana, 1987, p. 73) 
 
So here we have the first difference between the enactive approach and the autopoietic theory: 
while for the enactive approach autonomy (self-determination) is a distinctive characteristic of 
living systems, possessed in virtue of their organizational closure, for the autopoietic theory au-
tonomy (structural determinism) is a constitutive property of any system, whether or not it is liv-
ing or organizationally closed. However, the key difference between the enactive approach and 
the autopoietic theory, at least for our purposes in this paper, lies in the idea of autonomy as or-
ganizational closure.  
 
3.1 Organizational closure 
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In section 2 we said that the enactivist’s notion of autonomy comes originally from Varela’s 
work on organizational closure in the 1970s. But the whole story is that Varela’s notion of organ-
izational closure comes in turn from Maturana’s work on functional and organizational closure in 
the second half of the 1960s. The interesting point, as already noted, is not to establish a hierar-
chy of antiquity or originality, but to analyze the reach of the notion of organizational closure in 
the autopoietic theory and compare it with the enactive version.  
It is (more or less) known that in the 1960s, before having the word ‘autopoiesis’ at hand, 
Maturana already conceived of living beings as circular (closed) systems of production – as self-
producing systems. What is not so well known is that he conceived of living beings as closed 
systems not only from the point of view of their productive chemical processes, but also, and 
more crucially, from the point of view of their functional organization as senso-effector systems.4  
 
The sensory and the effector surfaces that an observer can describe in an actual 
organism, do not make the […] system an open […] network because the envi-
ronment (in which the observer stands) acts only as an intervening element 
through which the effector and sensory [surfaces] interact completing the closure 
of the system. (Maturana, 1975, p. 318) 
 
The autopoietic claim that living systems are closed systems needs careful handling. The func-
tional organization of the senso-effector system of the living being is closed, but this is not be-
cause the environment is left outside the system. Rather, it is because the environment is always 
incorporated as a functional step within the system. The senso-effector system is not closed to 
                                                
4 See e.g. Maturana,’s contribution to Maturana & Varela, 1980, or his lovely autobiographical account in Maturana, 
2013 
17 
 
the environment; it closes on itself through the environment. Thus, the autopoietic view does not 
aim to deny the fact that, from a material and energetic point of view, living beings are essential-
ly open systems (dissipative chemical structures) that interact with their environments - consum-
ing nutrients and eliminating waste, for example. The sense of closure at issue for the autopoietic 
theorist is just the closure of sensorimotor loops through the environment that we saw the enac-
tivist endorse in 2.1, above. The activities at the sensory and effector surfaces of an organism are 
co-dependent in the sense that the quoted passage from Merleau-Ponty indicates (p.8, above). 
What happens at the effector surfaces of an organism conditions, through the structure of the en-
vironment, what happens at its sensory surfaces. But what happens at its sensory surfaces is 
likewise conditioned, through the structure of the organism, by what happens at its effector sur-
faces. So what is closed here is the circuit of the organism’s sensorimotor activity, a circuit 
which incorporates causal interchange with the environment. 
 
Recall from section 2.2 that, for the enactivist, it is just this circular nature of an organism’s sen-
sorimotor dynamics that results in the emergence of a meaningful environment for the organism, 
to which the organism is directed. The autopoietic theorist, however, draws a very different les-
son from the closed dynamics of senso-effector systems. Just as Merleau-Ponty noted that there 
is no non-arbitrary way of designating what comes first in the dynamic cycle of perception and 
action, the autopoietic theorist notes that, as far as the closed structural dynamics of the system 
are concerned, there is no non-arbitrary way of carving the sensorimotor loop up into distinct 
portions. In other words, what we see as the salient boundary between the internal states of the 
organism and the external states of its environment is something that, as far as the sensorimotor 
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dynamics of the system are concerned, proves to be operationally ‘transparent’ and does not exist 
as such: 
 
An observer that sees an effector/sensor correlation as an adequate behavior does 
so because he or she beholds the organism in the domain of structural coupling in 
which the distinguished behavior takes place in the flow of its conservation of ad-
aptation. The organism in its operation [, nonetheless,] does not act upon an envi-
ronment; the environment exists only for an observer (Maturana, 2003, pp. 102-
103) 
 
The autopoietic theorist thus holds that the ‘environment’ portion of the closed loop is something 
that exists only for an observer, rather than reflecting a boundary specified by the causal dynam-
ics of the loop itself. The same applies to what we, as observers, can identify as the ‘organism’ 
portion of the loop. Maturana concludes that: “For a living system in its operation as a closed 
system there is no inside or outside, [simply] it has no way of making the distinction” (Maturana, 
2003, p. 99).  
 
At this point, if the reader recalls the enactive version of the notion of autonomy, we can al-
ready see not only an important difference regarding the rendition of the concept of organiza-
tional closure, but a completely different conception of living beings and their “relationship” 
with the environment. Let us recapitulate what we have seen until now.  
So far, we have seen that both theories, autopoietic and enactive, subscribe to the view that 
living beings exhibit organizational closure. Nonetheless, starting from this point in common, 
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these theories seem to arrive at very different conclusions about living beings. In the enactive 
case, we have the view of a system that, being autonomous, emerges as a self that is intentionally 
directed at a world, that defines an inside and an outside, and to which the environment appears 
endowed with significance and value. In the other case, we have the view of a system that does 
not distinguish itself from anything, to which there is no inside and outside, and to which some-
thing like ‘the environment’ or ‘the world’ does not exist at all.  
 
 
4     NO DIRECTION, NO BEGINNING, NO END 
 
So, the autopoietic and enactive theories begin from a shared emphasis on organizational closure, 
but arrive at opposing conclusions about directionality and teleology in living systems. Who 
should we side with? Our contention is that here we should side with the autopoietic theorist here 
– the ‘existential’ attitude to living systems that we sketched in the introduction cannot be legit-
imated by appeal to organisational closure. The reasons for this are ones we have just reviewed 
on behalf of the autopoietic theorist – so let us consolidate them.  
 
If we draw an arrow and ask you where it begins, where it ends, and where it points, you should 
be able to answer easily. If we draw a circle and ask you the same questions, you should strug-
gle. The simple explanation for this is that arrows have starting points, end points and direction-
ality, whereas circles do not. The moral of the considerations about organizational closure in sec-
tions 2.1 and 3.1, above, is that the structural dynamic of a living system is like a circle, rather 
than like an arrow. So if living systems are to be construed as being directed toward their envi-
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ronments, or if their cognitive processes are to be construed as having beginnings and ends, then 
this must be in virtue of something other than their organizational closure. 
 As we have seen Merleau-Ponty, Maturana, and Thompson agree, there is no way of de-
fining starting and end points in a continuous and circular process of sensorimotor correlations. 
We also saw above that an observer might, for the sake of certain descriptive purposes, treat sen-
sorial stimulation as a starting point and the motor response as an end point. However, doing so 
would be a reflection of the interests of the observer, rather than of the dynamics of the system. 
If sensory or motor processes are to be construed as having beginnings and ends, then this must 
be in virtue of something other than their structural dynamics.  
Relatedly, if an organism’s sensorimotor system is closed in its dynamics in the way we have 
been discussing, then its sensory and motor surfaces are not entries and exits of the system, i.e., 
doors or windows through which the organism, considered as a sensorimotor entity, “contacts” 
the environment. They are rather functional points that, in their interaction, close the organism as 
sensorimotor system through the environment, as discussed in 3.1. In terms of its functional or-
ganization (not in terms of its physical boundaries, of course), the organism has the environment 
as one more of its functional components; not as something external to it. In other words what 
we see as the distinction between the environment and the organism is not a distinction we find 
within the organism’s closed sensorimotor dynamics. Now, if the functional organization of the 
organism’s sensorimotor interactions with its environment is strictly circular in this way, then 
each portion of the sensorimotor loop that we might single out fulfills exactly the same role – as 
a link in the larger loop through which the system closes on itself.  Can we identify, within such 
a system, a particular part of the sensorimotor loop toward which the rest of the system is di-
rected? If the portion of the loop that we, from our position as observers, see as the environment 
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of the organism is only one seamless link in the circular dynamics of the system, then what is the 
ground to say that this portion, rather than any other, is the one around which the rest of the sys-
tem works, the part to which the rest of the system points? When we say that the sensorimotor 
organization of the organism is circular, what we say is that said network is, as far as its struc-
tural dynamics are concerned, strictly symmetric and equivalent in all its portions. If we restrict 
our focus to an organism’s sensorimotor dynamics, then there is no non-arbitrary reason to single 
out one portion of its looping structure to which it is directed. In other words, if the sensorimotor 
activity of an organism is to be construed as directed toward its environment, then this must be in 
virtue of something other than its structural dynamics. 
To emphasise once more, as observers we can and do pick out particular portions of the sen-
sorimotor loops of living systems as points of reference and describe systems as oriented toward 
them. Indeed, since we as observers are actually located in one portion of the sensorimotor net-
work, namely the gap that we see between the sensory and motor surfaces of the organism, we, 
tacitly (as a sort of ‘natural attitude’), always choose that node as a point of reference. We see the 
organism’s functioning as directed precisely at the region in which we operate as observers, as 
oriented to what we see existing between the sensory and motor surfaces of the organism; that is, 
we naturally see an organism’s functioning as directed toward the environment in which we ob-
serve it. Such a perspective is only objectionable to an autopoietic theorist if we also assume that 
the directionality we see is a property of the organism’s own sensorimotor activity. Considered 
in itself, that sensorimotor activity is organizationally closed, and so without direction. We can 
compare the question of the direction or orientation of a closed sensorimotor system to the ques-
tion of whether a moving object is approaching or moving away. What is the answer that best 
reflects the structural dynamics of the object itself? Neither answer will do this – seeing an object 
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as moving away or as approaching depends on the particular point of reference adopted by the 
observer. Just as an object’s ‘approaching’ or ‘moving away’ aren’t properties that it can possess 
solely in virtue of its structural dynamics, an organism’s orientation to its world (if it has one) 
cannot be derived from the properties of its operationally closed sensorimotor interactions. 
 
The reader might have noticed that we have been conspicuously silent about the feature of the 
enactivist view that seems most important here – we saw in section 2.2 that, for the enactivist, an 
organism’s orientation toward a meaningful environment was possessed in virtue of the way the 
physical realization (or embodiment) of the organism and of its environment constrain its sen-
sorimotor activity. The sucrose in the bacterium’s environment becomes a nutrient, and some-
thing which the bacterium can need, or aim towards, in virtue of the structural properties of su-
crose and the bacterium’s embodiment, and the ways that those conspire to shape the bacterium’s 
sensorimotor coupling with its environment. Though this is indeed the key step in the enactivist’s 
legitimation of their existential attitude toward living systems, we have postponed our treatment 
of it until now because we think that appreciating the force of the points made above shows how 
it should be addressed. 
Remember the list of examples with which we opened this essay – we don’t think of rivers as 
moving according to their own purposes, or lightning as choosing its path to the ground, or of 
candles as seeking out oxygen to consume to keep their flame alight. Why should the ways in 
which we think of living systems be any different? We saw in section 2 that the enactivist answer 
appeals to the circular dynamics of the ways in which living systems selectively couple with as-
pects of their environment. But note that it is not only living systems that couple with some as-
pects of their environment rather than others. A burning candle remains alight as long as the 
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physical materials needed for the process of combustion are available in the environment. The 
continued existence of the candle’s flame is determined by the dynamics of its coupling with 
some elements of the air that is its environment rather than others – oxidizer gases such as oxy-
gen or nitrogen dioxide, and flammable gases such as ammonia and carbon monoxide. Inert gas-
es such as nitrogen, carbon dioxide and argon are irrelevant to the preservation of the flame, and 
are not involved in its burning. The structural properties of the candle and its environment thus 
determine the ways in which it couples with some elements of its environment rather than others 
in ways that keep its flame alight. Nonetheless, this does not provide us with reason to say that 
the candle seeks out oxygen, or that oxygen appears to it as valuable. The candle’s selective cou-
pling with the environment does not suffice to endow it with a perspective, or to place it on a 
continuum with our minds and their orientation to the world, in the ways that the enactivist 
claims for the bacterium’s coupling. This is not an isolated case. The water in Mario’s mug ab-
sorbs material from the tea leaves but not the tea bag. The fabric of Dave’s chair is shaped by the 
distribution of his mass on it, but not by the colour of his hair. Selective coupling does not suf-
fice for a system to be directed toward its environment.  
Perhaps the structural dynamics of these couplings don’t have the appropriate circular organi-
zation required by the enactivist. We are not sure about this – it certainly seems that the envi-
ronment’s gases are modulated by the activity of the candle’s flame just as closely as they modu-
late the flame’s activity; likewise the composition of Mario’s tealeaves is altered by the water as 
they in turn alter the water’s composition; and the shape of the chair’s fabric effects the way 
Dave distributes his mass, as well as his mass reciprocally effecting its shape. But even if it 
could be shown that these systems lack appropriate organizational closure, we are owed an ex-
planation of why this should matter. We saw earlier in this section that such organization does 
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not suffice for a system’s directedness to its environment. And we saw in the present discussion 
of the candle’s flame that selective coupling does not suffice either. Perhaps they are, as the en-
activist claims, jointly sufficient. But since there is good reason to believe that neither condition 
on its own implicates teleology, the enactivist needs to provide further explanation of why they 
should do so when combined. 
 
5     CONCLUSION 
 
The deep continuity of life and mind is a foundational (and, to many outside observers, coun-
terintuitive) aspect of the enactivist view – so why has it seemed to enactivists that this continui-
ty follows so straightforwardly from the properties of the structural dynamics of living systems? 
We conclude with the speculative suggestion that it is for reasons we have already mentioned 
above. As observers, it is clear to us that we can cleanly parse the dynamical loop of an organ-
ism/environment coupling into constituents of organism and environment. After all, the distinc-
tion between what is the organism, and what is its environment, is usually hard for us to miss. 
And once we have made this parsing, it is tempting to view the activity in the organismic portion 
of the loop as directed toward its environment, and the activity in the environmental part of the 
loop as directed toward the organism. It seems outlandish to deny, at least in the case of many 
complex organisms, that they do act in ways directed toward the world, and perceive in ways 
sensitive to their world. If we want to explain these facts, and are faced with the fact that the dy-
namics of a living system’s sensorimotor couplings are organizationally closed, it is easy to map 
the distinctions between organism and environment, and between states of the organism directed 
toward the environment and states of the organism inherited from the environment, onto appro-
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priate portions of those dynamics. But what we have argued in the foregoing is that undeniable 
as these distinctions may be to us as observers, they are not straightforwardly derived from the 
sensorimotor dynamics of living systems. As we noted at the outset, the enactivists existential 
attitude toward living systems may yet be justified. But enactivists are wrong to think that this 
attitude, and the commitment to a deep continuity of life and mind that it entails, are justified by 
appeal to selective, organizationally closed, sensorimotor couplings with the environment. As we 
also noted at the outset, it was not our aim here to demonstrate the truth of the autopoietic ap-
proach to the study of living systems. However, we think that we have shown in the foregoing 
that as matters stand, with respect to their views of the ramifications of the structural dynamics 
of living systems, the autopoietic approach is to be commended over enactivism.3 
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